; Li (1995:Appendix) . Table 2 Indicators of structural changes (per cent, period average) Ind ica to r 1952 Ind ica to r -60 1961 Ind ica to r -70 1971 Ind ica to r -80 1981 Ind ica to r -90 1991 
Explaining Taiwan's Success
Over tiie past 30 years, different explanations have been advanced of the East Asian miracle in general, and Taiwan's in particular. W hile the debate is far from setded, there is a growing consensus that, besides a stable social and political environment, macroeconomic stability is fundamental to sustained growth. At the micro or struc tural level, however, much less agreement has been achieved (Lall, 1996; Tsai, 1997) . The neoclassical paradigm holds that the successful East Asian economies shared crucial common characteristics; for instance, they all tended to 'get the prices right' and to rely on market signals for resource allocation, even if they did go beyond the pure neoclassical prescriptions o f 'law and order and infrastructure'. By contrast, revisionists argue that the fast-growing East Asian economies owe their achievements less to economic liberalism than to selective industrial policies involving strategies of industrial targeting, 'getting prices wrong', 'picking winners', or even 'creating winners'. W ade (1990), for example, has documented the exten sive employment of tariffs, quantitative restrictions, fiscal incentives and selective credit policies by the Taiwanese government during various stages of development.
In this article, some fundamental defects in the revisionist's arguments are highlighted.
See for example Bhagwati (1978) , Krueger (1978) , World Bank (1993), and Hill (1996) . For Taiwan, see Galenson (1979) , Ranis (1995) and Riedel (1996) . Lall (1996) and Ranis (1996) . The East Asian debate is not lim ited to the neoclassical and revisionist paradigms. For instance, Krugman (1994) claims that the growth was due simply to massive factor accumulation rather than productivity growth and thus there is noth ing miraculous in the East Asian experience.
The Path of Taiwan's Industrial Development
Primary import substitution (1952-67). Taiwan's industrial development since 1952 may be usefully divided into four phases: primary import substitution , transition and export promotion , secondary import substitution (1973-BO) , and promotion of strategic and high-tech industries (1981-present) .
The most well-documented policy initiative during the first phase was the land reform program carried out in 1949 -1953 (Ho, 1978 . It led to the rapid agricul tural growth and the advancement of agricultural technology, which facilitated indus trial development by providing it with agricultural surplus on the one hand and a sufficient market for industrial outputs on the other. Above all, the individualism of land reform had unexpectedly turned farmers into small modem economic agents. According to Li (1995) , this is die source of Taiwan's economic miracle.
Like most developing countries in the 1950s, Taiwan resorted to so-called pri mary or 'easy' import substitution (IS) (Lin, 1973; Ho, 1978) . Unlike in most coun tries adopting this strategy, however, Taiwan's IS policy aimed largely at saving for eign exchange rather dian self-sufficiency (Li, 1994; Kuo, 1997) . A battery of inter ventions, including protective tariffs, quantitative import restrictions, foreign ex change controls and multiple exchange rates, was used to encourage domestic pro duction of substitutes for imported goods such as textiles, cement and fertilisers. These policies, along widi deficit financing, selective credit allocation, entry barriers, control of raw materials allocation and so forth, protected die domestic infant in dustries and made a significant impact on Taiwan's earlier development.
Transition and export promotion (1958-72).
As is usually die case, die small pro tected domesdc market was quickly saturated, and primary import substitution lost momentum. Real GNP growdi rates fell every year during 1952-56; die growdi rate of industrial output declined to 11 per cent and diat of employment to 5 per cent in the second half of the 1950s (Ranis, 1979) . Hardly any foreign exchange was saved; in 1958, Taiwan was still running a trade deficit of some US$70m. These prob lems, along with increasing pressure from die United States, led ultimately to a wide-ranging reorientation of die development strategy. The most notable meas ures were die foreign exchange refonn, die Nineteen-Point Economic and Fiscal Reform Programme (the 19-point programme hereafter), and the Statute for the Encouragement of Investment (SEI).
Under die foreign exchange reform adopted at die end of 1957, the multiple exchange-rate system was gradually dismanded and in 1963 die rate was set at NT$ 40 to US$1. The single exchange rate system ended die overvaluation of the New Taiwan dollar and paved the way for a decade of buoyant export expansion (Wang, 1993; Haggard & Pang, 1994) .
The 19-point programme of 1960 was intended 'to encourage saving and in vestment, to reduce expenditure and to promote exports'. It reviewed the various stopgap measures adopted in the past, with the aim of liberalising them and restor ing market mechanisms; it established permanent economic institutions like die central banking system and capital market; and it provided preferential treatment to private business.
The SEI was designed to reduce die tax burden, to facilitate die acquisition of plant sites, and to simplify investment licensing procedures. At its core were tax incentives for exports, which were available for domestic as well as foreign investors. Within seven years, total tax exemption reached NT$3 billions, and GNP jumped 235 per cent during 1960-67. Total foreign direct investment soared to US$34.2m in 1960-63, up from US$10.9m in 1952-59. Until it was superseded by die Statute for Industrial Upgrading (SIU) at the end of 1990, die SEI was die most important piece of legislation promoting the industrial development of Taiwan. Odier meas ures promoting exports were die liberalisation of die foreign exchange allocation system, a special export loan programme, import liberalisation, and die establish ment of export processing zones. However, as Wade (1990) and Bräutigam (1995) have argued, trade liberalisation was generally limited to die export sector, widi die domestic market remaining heavily protected. Despite this, the transition toward export promotion still represented die most significant policy shift in Taiwan's postwar economic development.
Secondary import substitution (1973-80).
Following a series of economic and po litical shocks in die 1970s, there was a renewed emphasis on infrastructure as well as die role of state in the industrial development. In die Ten Major Construction Projects of 1974-78 die government invested some US$5 billion in six transporta tion projects, several nuclear power plants, an integrated steel mill, a large shipyard, and several petrochemical plants. The last three projects on diis list involved a pol icy of a secondary import substitution designed to establish a fully-fledged heavy and chemical industry (HCI). Also in 1973, die government set up the Industrial Tech nology Research Institute (ITRI), which received government contracts to conduct research programmes, develop key technologies and transfer the results to industry in a non-exclusive manner. Togedier widi the Institute for Information Industry (III) established in 1979, ITRI played a leading role in bodi industrial technology and manpower development, and laid the foundation for die intense promotion of high-tech industries after die 1980s.
Strategic and high-tech industries and liberalisation (1981-present).
The 1979 oil shock, die worsening labour shortage, increasing environmental concerns, and mounting protectionist pressure from the US in the 1980s led to a major shift of die development strategy in general and industrial policy in particular. Some HCI proj-ects were postponed or cancelled, and odier measures for industrial upgrading were adopted. First, following die announcement of the Ten Year Economic Develop ment Projection (1980-89), a set of 'strategic' industries was selected according to the so-called 'two-large' (large linkage effects, large market potential), 'two-high' (high rate of value added, high technology intensity), and 'two-low' (low energy in tensity, low pollution) criteria. Apart from the incentives in SEI, the government subsidised these industries dirough preferential medium-and long-term low interest loans and provided them with technology and management guidance (Smith, 1997a) .
Second, the Science and Technology Development Programme launched in 1978-79 identified energy, materials, information and automation for development through national effort. Mimicking the model of Silicon Valley, the Hsinchu Sci ence-Based Industrial Park (HSBIP) was established in 1980, and numerous meas ures were adopted to promote die growth of high-tech industries (Kuo, 1997) . The success of die HSBIP led in 1995 to a second science park being approved in Tainan.
Third, the 1980s witnessed accelerated liberalisation. Foreign exchange was decontrolled in 1987, and capital movement was freed. Bodi interest rates and the exchange rate were largely (diough not completely) deregulated. Most quantitative import controls were eliminated, and tariff protecdon was gready reduced. As for industrial policy, die most important development was die replacement of die SEI by die Statute for Industrial Upgrading (SIU) in 1991. The SIU offers incentives such as accelerated depreciation and tax breaks for energy conservation and as in dustrial modernisation. These incentives are functional radier dian being targeted to specific industries, as was die case under die SEI. This change reflects not only the increasing difficulties involved in pursuing selective policies as Taiwan's econ omy becomes more complex, but also die deepening integration of Taiwan in die world economy and die need to observe international policy norms.
Picking Winners?
As noted, the revisionists maintain that the East Asian miracle was brought about by planned strategies of industrial targeting, 'getting prices wrong', and 'picking' or 'creating winners'. This hypodiesis has met the challenge of at least two tests. First, the motivation question: were the selective policies consciously planned, and die winners judiciously picked to reap some long-run dynamic comparative advantage anticipated by government officials? Second, the causation question: were the un doubtedly extensive selective interventions in Taiwan a major determinant of Tai wan's extraordinary growth? Wade himself is somewhat cautious on diis point, conceding that 'The fact of big leadership or big fellowship does not mean that gov ernment intervention has been effective in promoting economic growth; it only means diat government cannot be dismissed as having made a negligible difference to outcomes' (Wade, 1990:305) . T he political motives were more complicated and in some sense more impor tant than the econom ic ones. First, the KMT recognised that one o f the key rea sons for its defeat on the mainland was its failure to carry out its promised land re form. It quickly undertook land reform in Taiwan to head off rural discontent stemming from the thirst for land by the poor peasants. Moreover, the reactivated farmer and irrigation associations were used to coopt the new class o f small land holders into the KMT support base. Second, the land reform was designed also to crush the indigenous landlord class, die only group that could pose a challenge to the transplanted KMT regime. Third, a reliable food supply was vital for the even tual counterattack on the Chinese mainland that the KMT envisaged at the time. Import substitution. Revisionists argue that various interventions and industry targeting policies during die IS phase contributed significantly to Taiwan's industrial development. This could be true, but at best only widi hindsight. During the 1950s, diere were few signs of any sensible vision about Taiwan's future develop ment, let alone any conscious strategies. Again, policies tended to be adopted in response to impending problems. Large amounts of foreign exchange were re quired to import die fertiliser needed for higher food producdon, to import cloth, and to import cement for repairing die war-tom infrastructure. As a result, die fer tiliser, textile and cement industries were targeted; and export industries reflecting Taiwan's comparative advantage, such as processed agricultural products, were en couraged.
As well as being a pragmatic response to die problems of the early 1950s, Tai wan's IS policy displayed several prominent characteristics. First was an emphasis on limited support to the targeted sectors and on the role of market^ which made it perfecdy consistent widi die conventional infant industry argument. According to K.Y. Yin, die architect of Taiwan's economic policy in the 1950s:
5
The revisionists tend to equate the neoclassical paradigm to absolute laissez faire, which is an unfor tunate mistake. Infant industry policy is perfecdy legitimate in the neoclassical paradigm. W hat con cerns orthodox economists is how the policy is carried ouL
The Government ... should give its support to those industries which it thinks must be developed and which are in need of its support. However, there should be a lim it... As to the development and growth ol die various industries ... it is still the responsibility of the industries themselves. From the long-range point of view, if normal development is to be attained, free competition must be maintained in order to attain higher efficiency, elimi nate uneconomical production ... Excessive support obviously hampers the operation of free competition and is bound to result in the creation of greenhouse industries dependent entirely upon the Government. (Yin, 1954:7) Second, IS policy never completely ignored the export sector. In fact, against the conservative camp, Yin had insisted on promoting exports even in the very early days of the IS, partly to increase the flow of foreign exchange and partly to reduce the risk of inflation while accelerating capital accumulation through restraining do mestic consumption (Wang, 1993) .
Most important, Taiwan's IS strategy represented a move towards liberalisation. The KMT was from the beginning strongly committed to statism, which is why Tai wan's public enterprise sector was much more significant dian those of the other newly industrialising countries. But gradually the KMT shifted from the doctrine of a 'planned economy' to one of 'planned free economy', culminating in the dras tic policy reform of the late 1950s. The policy reorientation during 1958-63 had little to do with 'governing the market' or 'picking winners'. This could not be bet ter illustrated than by the quotation at the start of this article.
The secondary IS. The increasing dirigisme during die phase of the secondary IS seems to fit die revisionists' interpretadon of Taiwan's experience. Wade (1990:87) argues diat 'The new direction of industrialisation was in fact mapped out long be fore die mid-1970s', citing passages from the Third Four-Year Plan (1961-64) and die Fourth Four-Year Plan (1965-68) . It should be noted diat, during die 1960s, many East Asian countries, including Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines, had development or industrialisation plans of various lengdis (Hsu, 1997) . However, few of them developed successfully simply because of diese plans. In the case of Taiwan, Fei (1992) observes that 'In actual practice, die planning ... was litde more than a rough classification of all industries according to aphorisms imagined by the bureaucrats'. Tso-Jung Wang, K.Y. Yin's own chief economist and the drafter of die 19-point programme, sadly pointed out in 1968:
The key problem is that our Government never pays attention to economic planning ... If you do not believe, you might go to check die office of the vice-chairman of the Council for International Economic Cooperation and Development (CIECD), the Minister of Economic Affairs, die Minister of Finance ... and see whether you could find a copy of die Fourth Four-Year Plan. If you are unfortunate enough to find one, it is for sure that it will be covered with thick dust. But you know that they are the key figures giving all the directions during the process of making the plans; they are the highranking officers responsible for implementing the plans. (Cited in Lin, 1995: 203; author's translation) So why and how was the secondary IS policy finalised? The most important reason was die accession of Chiang Ching-Kuo to the vice-premiership and die chairmanship of CIECD in 1969. Chiang made decisions virtually alone. He was inclined to Soviet-type economic planning as well as to heavy industries, probably owing to his training in the USSR. To consolidate his polidcal power, he initiated a wave of state-led industrialisation. In 1972 he became prime minister, and the following year announced the grandiose Ten Major Construction Projects, much to the surprise even of K.T. Li, the Minister of Finance who was responsible for fi nancing them (Wang, 1993) . The Projects turned out to contribute gready to Tai wan's rapid recovery from the two oil crises and to economic growdi diereafter. But diey were by no means designed to counter business cycles or shocks (Kuo, 1997) . The success was fortuitous, and, pace die revisionists, had nothing to do with any judicious selection.
High-tech industries. While progress from gradual to accelerating liberalisation has been die most important characteristic of die Taiwan economy since die early 1980s, revisionists often cite the government's active role in promoting high-tech industries as evidence of continuing dirigisme in Taiwan. It is argued dial widiout the government's initiative and support, there would be no ITRI, no III, no Elec tronic Research Services Organisation, no HSBIP, and dius no semiconductor in dustry, no information industry, no United Microelectronics Corporation and no Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Corporation. The argument is valid if we confine ourselves to a very special sector of the economy and to post-1970 devel opment. But die high-tech semiconductor and information industries arc only a part, however crucial, of die wider electrical and electronics industry. Hobday claims:
The Taiwanese Government's initial motive for encouraging electronics ... was to create employment, earn foreign exchange and exploit what was a fast-growing export opportunity. In the early days there was litde strategic thinking about die place o f electronics and infonnadon technology in eco nomic development. (Hobday, 1995:104; emphasis added) In electronics, it is likely that direct technological and industrial intervention had litde effect during the 1960s and 1970s. Left to the market, die TNCs and hundreds of latecomer firms began the industry by manufacturing sim ple products. ... Many small Taiwanese businesses mistrusted government, feared officialdom and kept their distance from state agencies. It is unlikely that specific programmes led direcdy to the start-up of many latecomer firms, or affected directly the strategies of large private companies such as Tatung, Sampo and Teco. ... Taiwan's vigor in the electronics industry de pended primarily on strategies and abilities of entrepreneurs, engineers and managers. (Hobday, 1995:98) This suggests that the government's role in the development of Taiwan's high-tech industries was not as the revisionists depict. The argument can be taken further. The electrical and electronics industries were already the second largest export sec tor in the mid-1960s, after textile products. By 1973, when ITRI was established, it had exceeded all manufacturing industries in terms of value added. Consequently, in this particular case at least, it seems more legitimate to say that the government was flexible enough to attach itself to the winners rather than judicious enough to pick the winners.
Efficacy o f selective interventions. Nevertheless, the government did attempt to 'create winners' on some occasions. The most prominent example is the long se ries of failed attempts to promote the automobile industry. While admitting this as 'a case where protection has indeed had the predicted neoclassical results', Wade (1990:102) insists that 'it is an unusual case rather than the norm in Taiwan'. True, it was not the norm, but nor was it that unfamiliar in Taiwan. For example, there was the unsuccessful attempt to promote the aircraft industry, as detailed in Huang (1995) ; and there was a drive to encourage large-scale general trading companies, in the hope of unshackling Taiwanese firms from the control of Japanese sogo shosha (general trading companies) in international marketing. The government is still struggling with the aircraft programme, in a much lower gear, whereas the large-scale general trading companies programme was quietly terminated.
As for other policies discussed in this article, several studies have systemati cally examined their successes and failures. Smith (1997a) has succinctly summa rised most of the findings. The results were mixed. For instance, the SEI was found to be quite effective in the initial stages of industrial development in encour aging investment, but the effectiveness of tax incentives had diminished over time. Investment credits indeed stimulated investment, but the goal of facilitating the ac quisition of plant sites was not generally achieved. Government intervention clearly had some success in assisting high-tech industries, but strategic industry policy actu ally discriminated against the industries it aimed to promote (Smith, 1997b) . By contrast, Pack and Lin (1997) find that as much as 40 per cent (the upper bound) of the annual 5 per cent total factor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector could be attributed to industrial policy; yet even on this favourable estimate, selec tive intervention would account for only 0.33 of a percentage point of economy wide growth. As a result, they conclude that 'picking' or (more fashionably) 'creat ing' winners was not a major determinant of Taiwan's extraordinary growth.
Industry Policy and the East Asia Crisis: Taiwan vs Korea
The current economic crisis in East Asia has confounded both sides of the debate on the causes of the economic miracle, which now looks more like a mirage. How ever, a consensus is emerging among observers to the effect that the crisis is partly rooted in government-directed lending, which in turn is closely related to the indus try policies pursued by some of the troubled economies in the past few decades (Gamaut, 1998; Hong, 1998; Krugman, 1998) . In order to implement selective interventions, as the revisionists correctly point out, the government required finan cial intermediaries to make credit available to designated borrowers at subsidised interest rates. As a result, the financial intermediaries were believed to be backed by die government in the form of explicit or implicit guarantees for their depositors. But the government's guarantees, real or illusory, fostered moral hazard, encourag ing the intermediaries to take excessive risks. The financial market inevitably de generated into a vicious circle of bad loans, bankruptcies, and bailouts.
The contrast between Taiwan and Korea is particularly striking in this respect. Both are frequendy cited as exemplars of East Asian success. However, as Table 3 suggests, the Korean economy has so far performed far worse dian Taiwan's. The difference in their industrial strategies provides at least a partial explanation of diis. Korea's aggressive selective industrial policy concentrated economic power in the hands of a small number of large-scale industries, the chaebols, and wiped out the small enterprises. It also nurtured a complex, under-regulated bank system con trolled by die government and the chaebols, whose inherent moral hazard created the precondidons for the present crisis. By contrast, selective policies have been far less evident or important in Taiwan. Although policies like die directed allocation of investment funds were widely applied and tended to favour large and public en terprises, they were by no means comparable to those of Korea. Indeed, die KMT government was reluctant to foster chaebol-type private business groups, pardy be cause of the bitter lessons it learned on die Chinese mainland and pardy because it distrusted Taiwanese entrepreneurs. As a result, thousands of small and medium sized enterprises flourished, ironically helped more by an extraordinarily efficient informal financial market than by government-directed credit. This conspicuous contrast in industrial structure between the Korean and the Taiwanese models could largely explain the very different consequences of die Asian crisis in die two countries.
Conclusion
In this article I have pointed out some fundamental flaws in the revisionists' argu ment diat the key to Taiwan's economic success lies in governing the market, and in particular its pursuit of selective industry policies. Four findings stand out.
First, the Taiwanese government did intervene extensively and selectively during various stages of industrial development, but most intervention was either a re sponse to impending problems or politically motivated rather than the outcome of judicious selection.
Second, there is no clear-cut evidence that selective intervention was effective. At most, selective industry policy could have boosted total factor productivity in some promoted sectors; however, the magnitude was o f little significance in ex plaining Taiwan's phenomenal economy-wide growth. Even here, govemmerit could well not have 'picked' winners but rather attached itself to them.
Third, lack o f information has led the revisionists to overlook the long-term trend in Taiwan's industrial policy towards liberalisation, including the movement from a 'planned econom y' to a 'planned free econom y' in the early import substitu tion phase.
Finally, Taiwan's much stronger economic performance than Korea's during the continuing East Asian econom ic crisis suggests that government-directed indus trial policy based on easy money is self-defeating and is no recipe for fast and sus tained econom ic growth.
